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Performing the nation: the Janus-faced populist foundations of
illiberalism in Hungary
Emilia Palonen
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
Hungary once represented a school-book case of transition to democ-
racy. Now it offers insights into both contemporary Europe and theories
of populism and nationalism. Resisting the traditional linear perspective
to transition and a ‘demographic’ view of democracy, this article explores
the relationships among democracy, populism and nationalism. This
article operationalises performative and post-foundational theory of
populism as a logic of articulation to explain Fidesz and the party leader
Viktor Orbán’s illiberal measures, dichotomies between them and us,
ultimately leading to nationalism and xenophobia. It shows how revolu-
tion, ‘illiberalism’ and migrants have served for populist meaning-making
and are related to the political polarisation in Hungary. This article
enhances the understanding of democracy by discussing the performa-
tive features of nation-building, populism and law-making in contem-
porary politics and finally the ‘Janus-face’ of populism. It sees 1989 as a
populist moment of constitution of the foundations of a new era but also
of the people central to democracy, and recognises attempts to generate






During the 2010s, power to the people is called for again all over Europe. ‘People’, or those who
represent or constitute them, is declared a legitimate historical actor, and the basis or praxis of
liberal democracy is contested. The transition to democracy around 1989 in Central Eastern Europe
was hailed and feared by many in the region as a ‘rebirth of the nations’. Hungary was the model
case for this smooth transition: liberal democracy with the rule of law was quickly installed, and it
was thought that civil society would emerge from the strong dissident traditions. In the seemingly
one-directional transition, U-turns (Ágh 2016) have recently begun to occur. The Prime Minister
since 2010, Viktor Orbán, called for illiberalism and contested the foundations of the rule of law
established in 1989. His third consecutive election victory consolidated power to Fidesz in 2018.
While this article offers an outline of political meaning-making in Hungary during 1989–2018, it is
mainly a theoretical discussion of the interconnected nationalism, populism and democracy that
enhance the understanding of contemporary developments in Europe. This article explores how
nationalism and populism with their distinctions and similarities entangle, also with democracy?
This article takes a post-foundational perspective drawing on the political theorist Ernesto
Laclau on populism, hegemony and contingent, rhetorical foundations of society (Laclau 2005;
Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2014; Marchart 2007), and by extension law-making.1 Following
Laclau (2005), populism is an anti-thesis of institutionalism and a logic of articulation that turns
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people into a historical or universalising political subject. This article’s anti-essentialist, immanent
reading of Laclau stresses contingency and performativity (see Butler 2015): instead of ‘the people’
as a nominal reference, any form of ‘us’ could become that historical subject to represent or
constitute a new political actor. New political positions and communities emerge in moments, such
as in 1989, when the foundations of society are contested and renewed.
The article has three aims. The overall aim is to discuss a post-foundational theory of populism
(Laclau 2005, 2014; Marchart 2007) that enables us to understand the case of Hungary as a process
of politics and democracy. Without pre-given foundations of society, ‘the people’ is a contingent,
temporary and fleeting articulation and should be imagined as part of a democratic process (Laclau
2014). ‘The people’ and ‘the nation’ are articulated through relationships, political struggle and
common demands. Politics too contests existing and generates new structures of meaning or
hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The articulations of ‘the people’ and ‘illiberal democracy’
generated new structures of meaning and new dichotomies in politics in Hungary.
Second, the article deals with political polarisation: two sides of the political spectrum were
generating a ‘people’ by opposing and demonising each other. The foundations of legitimacy in
Hungary became laden with dichotomous populism. The article sheds light on the transformation
after 1989 and Viktor Orbán as a key meaning-maker in Hungarian politics. Emerging in the late
1990s, political polarisation explains illiberal constitutional reforms in the 2010s. From the post-
foundational perspective, the article argues, contingent and always rearticulated polarisation is a
part of (radical) democracy (Mouffe 2005) until it gets sedimented and institutionalised to cliente-
lism and eventually authoritarianism, whereas in ‘demography’ (socio-economically bound under-
standing of political democracy in some forms of liberal democracy), polarisation happens through
established cleavages.
Third, this article discusses the distinction between nationalism and populism and their funda-
mental similarity. It explores how populist articulation does not equate nationalism, anti-immigra-
tion and anti-EU rhetoric, even if nationalism and populism become entangled. Some scholars (e.g.
Müller 2016) locate the danger of populism in de facto nationalism even though these two ought
not to be confused (c.f. Palonen 2017; Stavrakakis and Jäger 2017; De Cleen 2017). Yet, there is
something similar about nationalism and populism. In political theory, civic nationalism prevails in
the constitution and maintenance of political communities necessary for democracy and even the
state (Anderson 1983; Smith 1998; Billig 1995; Breuilly 1993), but attention should be drawn to the
precise ways in which it entangles with nationalism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Normatively,
nationalism is a Janus-faced phenomenon (Nairn 1997), good and bad – necessary and a challenge
– for democracy; so is populism (Laclau 2005).
As a theoretical case study, this article offers a deep perspective (Flyvbjerg 2006), shedding light
on related contemporary processes in various European countries, and particularly those in East
Central Europe. Populist rhetoric’s constitutive force evokes attention to performativity and mean-
ing-making in politics (Laclau 2005; Moffitt 2016). The method is discourse theoretical where
operationalising theoretical concepts into praxis enhances understanding and even explains cer-
tain political and historical developments (Glynos and Howarth 2007). Given the rhetoric-perfor-
mative character or populism and nationalism, a post-foundational discourse-theoretical approach
should focus on populist ‘moments’ rather than on populism or nationalism as such. ‘Populist
moments’ were already present in Laclau’s early work on populism, but the under-theorised
concept of ‘moments’, as distinct from elements of a discourse, emerged in Laclau’s (1990) work
on South Africa. Moments enable us to grasp the significant processes of identification and
disidentification as well as challenges to and establishment of new structures of meaning.
The article has the following structure: First, it briefly discusses democratic transition’s concep-
tual basis and outlines the research topic of transitional democracy, nationalism, and populism in
Hungary. Second, the theoretical part outlines the post-foundational, rhetoric performative
approach, drawing on Laclau’s work, and discusses three concepts: nation, populism and polarisa-
tion. Third, the more empirical part engages with populist moments in recent Hungarian history
2 E. PALONEN
and the discursive production of political difference, at the national articulation in 1989, emergence
of polarisation that co-constituted the left and right, the figure of Viktor Orbán. Fourth, in
particular, the article discusses three ways of othering that have been used to constitute ‘the
people’ as the Fidesz political community. Fifth, the final sections discuss what can be learned from
this case for democracy, transition and the Janus-faced entangled phenomena of nationalism and
populism. This includes the post-foundational distinction between (radical) democracy and (institu-
tional liberal democratic) demography; or the articulation of political differences and us-building as
a Janus-faced part of democracy not seen as a regime but as a process, and the socio-economic
interest based form of democracy.
Linear transition to democracy
In the 1990s and 2000s, Western political scientists and commentators saw the ‘return’ of the
former Soviet-controlled countries ‘back’ into the Western ‘camp’ as something already achieved. In
2005, most commentators thought Hungary was on the right track, but concerns about democracy
were raised (Korkut 2005, 149). In East Central Europe, legacies of discontent among the masses
over governance in their name or interest prevail. In the early 1990s, the British-Hungarian
academic George Schöpflin (1993) warned of post-communist legacies that would haunt the region
even after the democratic systems and rule of law were instituted. This resonates with Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) understanding of revolution as never being a total break.
From the perspective of international politics, Hungary had an already-functioning democratic
system – ratified by the international community – becoming a member of NATO in 1999 and the
European Union in 2004. The Hungarian case challenges a unidirectional ‘transition’ or the idea that
democratisation would always be progressing towards democracy (c.f. Carothers 2002), yet the
linear metaphor is still present (e.g. the ‘‘bumpy road’ and ‘backsliding’ of democracy in Ágh 2013,
2014). As in the 1990s, Hungary was a fast-learning top student among the transitional countries
and surprise was felt at the reversal in its assumed linear progression (Ágh 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016).
For a linear democratisation, subsequent ‘u-turns’ represent a backsliding anomaly (Kornai 2015;
Ágh 2016, 2014). Authoritarianism easily prevails in the age of democratisation (Krastev 2011).
In the 2010s, Ágh (2015) argued that Potemkin democracy is moving towards elected autocracy,
echoing competitive authoritarianism. The democratisation process in Hungary is viewed through
the consolidation of democracy (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010; cf. Herman 2015), the constitution
(Jenne and Mudde 2012) or liberalism (Korkut 2012). While it is necessary to look at the exact ways
of ‘backsliding’, there is no linear process in democratisation in Hungarian politics. Ultimately, the
emergence of populism contests and reassesses the foundations of comparative politics (e.g.
AAchen and Bartels 2016). Populism is not simply about majority rule (c.f. Krastev 2017) but also
articulates contingent bases for difference (Kioupkiolis 2016) and democracy. Subsequently, we
discuss key concepts of nation, populism and polarisation from a post-foundational perspective.
Nation
The question of who are the people in whose name politicians are ruling is a core question in
political theory and praxis. Politicians in a democracy would always re-establish legitimacy of their
rule to the people, often conflated with ‘the nation’ as the legitimate demos. Nationalism in
Western Europe emerged as civic nationalism bound by the territory, but nation-state congregation
has never been straightforward (e.g. Breuilly 1993). The end of communist rule was for many
considered a moment of national unity. The opposition formed a hegemonic front and round-table
talks brought a new era, both rule of law and national expression became entangled. For some
countries, Hungary and Poland, for example, the 2010s were problematic because those who had
been representing the ‘foreign rule’ were part of the constitutive pact for a new society. For them it
was not a mere form that was at stake but substance itself. Instead of affording the place of
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legitimacy for law, as in liberal constitutionalism, legitimacy emerges from the people or the nation
in the constitutional thinking of Schmitt (2008).
Politically, nationhood is a 19th century project for securing regional power for elites of given
origin: the criteria of nationhood emerged and were listed and debated by scholars in nationalism
theory. As Anthony D. Smith (1998, 4) has argued, nationalism theory had given in to (post)
modernity and its characteristics such as unpredictability, difficulty of pinning down nationalism,
historical specificity of nation, social constructionism behind equality and emphasis on social
conditions and political processes. From the modern perspective, ‘nation’ can offer a contingent,
contestable and multidimensional basis for political unity, yet from the (pre)modern perspective it
is tied to certain institutional dimensions (Smith 1998) or even ethnicity and socio-economic
demography.
Indeed, from the post-foundational perspective, nationhood is founded upon the processes of
‘imagining’ (Anderson 1983). Nation is presented as fixed and eternal, symbolised in everyday or
celebrative representations as ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995). Studying the development of
democracy, state and building in East Central Europe and the Balkans, scholars have observed
how myths of nationhood (Hosking and Schöpflin 1997) offer fantasies of salvation (Tismaneanu
2009). Affective ties generate the appeal and sediment nationalist rhetoric on contingent grounds.
The key to nationalism’s Janus face is in the way in which it can generate communities
necessary for politics, the basis of volonté generale, or even economy (Nairn 1997). Hungary’s
transitional legitimacy was founded upon independence from Soviet rule and consequently
‘nation’ became a key signifier in the 1990s. The same chain of reference included economic
transition with prospective Western lifestyles, and political liberties. As the parties had to differ-
entiate themselves, they sought to articulate togetherness and community in new ways.
Populism and polarisation
Like nation, ‘the people’ is symbolised (Panizza 2005; 3; Laclau 2005), staged and performed in
‘polemical configuration of ways of acting’ (Rancière 2011, 14–15). In this process, people, plebs or
other ‘part’ represents ‘the whole’ and becomes a historical subject (Laclau 2005). It generates
contingent and temporary unity between the disparate, otherwise incompatible groups, expresses,
and momentarily constitutes, ‘us the people’. This could also be constructed mainly through a
negation or rejection. Not being fully inclusive, the people, as always, assumes a limit (Butler 2015).
Rather than being a substantive ideology, populism contains an empty core (Freeden 2017; Laclau
2014; Stavrakakis 2014).
Following Laclau, this article argues that populism has a particular form: a dichotomy, an
emptying-out point of identification and affect, which generate a new form of collective subject
or consolidate an old one. Similar to almost any political articulation in populism, these three are
emphasised. A political ‘us’ requires process of linking between groups and demands ‘equivalential
chains’, establishing limits to this chain, and adoption of a unifying symbol for the whole chain
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985) New political meanings emerge as fixed perspectives and dominant
frames of interpretation get contested. The political ‘us’ or ‘other’ at the core of populist articula-
tion often draws on invented terms that generate new shared ground (Laclau 2014, 2005; Palonen
and Saresma 2017). Even though populism is an empty form of articulation, it becomes entangled
with other things.
Populist moments seem to emerge in a crisis of representation (between rulers and the ruled),
which reorders and simplifies political space (Moffitt 2016; Stavrakakis 2014; Kriesi and Pappas
2015). In crisis, something always impedes the full constitution of the national identity (Stavrakakis
2014) but populism provides a fantasy of salvation. Populism brings new political demands to the
fore and can give voice to those who did not have it previously. Still, Carlos de la Torre (2010, 200)
has highlighted that in Latin America populism appears to call for the people but resorts to
unmediated forms of democracy and hierarchical, leader-centred power relations. Articulating a
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crisis, with a focus on the leader and the constitutive political frontier, populists maintain the hype
necessary for a political identification process. Media scholars have pointed to the populist ‘life-
cycle’: populism can also wear off (Mazzoleni, Steward and Horsefield 2003; Herman 2015). ‘Crisis’
and even ‘revolution’ may be used to maintain populist hype.
Populism’s Janus-face is its ambiguous relationship to democracy (c.f. Laclau 2005; Moffitt 2016;
151; Butler 2015). Following Schmitt’s critical reader Chantal Mouffe (2000), when the enemy is
defeated it becomes difficult to argue one’s own position. The people can also be claimed to be
generating the other of the ‘us’ (Palonen 2009; Butler 2015) as opposed to the ‘illegitimate’
opposition. Politics and democracy need clearly stated alternatives for people to group around
(Mouffe 2005). Just as nationalism often thrives on the limits of ‘the nation’, populist articulation
thrives on a stark division between us and them (c.f. De Cleen 2017) – leaving at least one of these
rather undefined. A top-down sedimentation of the dichotomous frontier brings out the negative
face of populism (Palonen 2009; Gürhanli 2018). Just as nationalisms may polarize (Egry 2015),
populism can be bipolar (Palonen 2009). The articulation of ‘the people’ or nationhood can happen
in a bi-polar manner.
Political polarisation occurs when two political camps defined themselves through the rejection
of the other. (Palonen 2009). This duality enabled the different parties or coalitions in Hungarian
politics to make their claims in politics without much self-description and fostering of negative
portrayal of the other (Palonen 2009; Körösényi 2013; Cox and Gallai 2013). The constitution of
political identities and cleavages through a stark polarisation from the period of the first Fidesz
government (1998–2002) to the latest ones (from 2010 potentially to 2022) is coupled with a
popular disengagement with politics. In Hungary, left and right was not a traditional cleavage and
establishment of two-party politics. Rather than being demographically sedimented, interest-
bound or constant demand, polarisation is performative and explainable through populism theory.
The following sections analyse the emergence of dichotomies and sedimentation of populist
rhetoric in Hungary after 1989.
Performing the nation in Hungary
As argued above, from the post-foundational perspective, society does not pre-exist articulation,
and must be somehow articulated through practices as the basis of democracy. The post-1989
events were central in this regard. In Hungary, whoever controls the expressions of nation and the
discursive constitution of ‘us the people’ related to it claims to have a legitimate right to control
the state – including the constitution or law-making (Miklóssy in this issue).
Throughout the 1990s, in Hungary, the political contestation over the choice of past, and hence
nationhood, was evident (c.f. Nyyssönen 1999). Despite particularly left-wing attempts to introduce
the rule of law and political rights as the basis of the new era, the Hungarian right has connected
parliament and political governance to the nation (Miklóssy 2008). Discussion about the location of
the crown of St. Stephen as a symbol of Hungarian statehood and sovereignty represents a prime
example (Nyyssönen 2008). The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2016) makes several mentions to
the past and nationhood, and showcases the illegitimacy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party,
particularly in Article U. It is a case in point for continued political polarisation (Palonen 2009). The
construction of ‘nation’ through historiography has been a battle: in this narrative, ‘the once
contested but unitary Hungarian nation was split almost unnoticed into a full-fledged constructive,
liberal nationalist, and a full-fledged, organicist, ethnic one’ (Egry 2018, 203).
In the first free elections competing visions of imagining ‘the people’ was at stake. Those with
references to the nation became victorious. The 1990 elections were won by the Hungarian
Democratic Forum (MDF), umbrella of the former national opposition. The Alliance of Free
Democrats (SZDSZ) was composed largely of dissidents from the former democratic opposition
and the reformed Socialists, the former powerholders.
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Ethno-nationalism flourished as the first Prime Minister, József Antall, claimed to represent
15 million Hungarians, while the population of the Hungarian state was merely 10 million. Antal
referred to the Hungarian diaspora in the neighbouring countries but he did not contest the rule of
law or move to irrendentist (calling to return the lost areas) claims for reuniting areas of the pre-
WWI Hungary. Contrasting Orbán and Antall, Egedy (2013, 67–68) argues that Antall’s ‘patrician
conservatism’ was ‘committed to the doctrine of the rule of law and – in keeping with ancient
Hungarian constitutional traditions – accepted the legal-civic concept of the nation.’ The relation-
ship between the state and the individual formed the basis of identity of the members of the
nation. MDF was an umbrella of several opposition groups for whom nation was the universalisable
historical actor, or to follow Laclau’s theory, the historical subject taking the function of the
universal.
In December 1993, before the second free elections, Antall’s death generated a crisis on the political
right. Crisis was in the air more generally as criticism conquered post-1989 euphoria. The Socialist party
won the 1994 general elections and formed a coalition government with the second largest party, the
liberal SZDSZ. Many Hungarians considered the coalition with the former rulers as unholy. The
Socialists were seen as the particular former oppressors unable to legitimately represent the people
or perform the role of the universal subject. The people-making ethos of post-1989 was more in line
with the populist political logic, where the government temporarily constitutes the representation of
people, than with the tradition of coalitions based on interests or cleavages. Rejection of the coalition
generated by the two largest parties opened political space on the right, which still lacked clear
leadership. Orbánmoved Fidesz to the national-conservative right where they simultaneously retained
their radical edge. Criticism of the socialist-liberal government grew, and the 1998 elections brought in
a Fidesz-MDF coalition government.
Many liberal intellectuals in Hungary were shocked that ‘the party of the youth’ sought to keep
themselves outside the pre-1989 divisions, and yet exploited the momentum of choosing sides. As a
student politician, Orbán gave a historic speech at Imre Nagy’s reburial, a highpoint in the ‘1989
revolution’ (Bozóki 2009) or ‘negotiated transition’. Nevertheless, leading the party of youth, he sought
to articulate a historical subject, undivided ‘youth’ against the ‘old’ parties, pact-making dissidents and
power-holders. Later, they would seek to constitute the people as a whole through this negation.
In Egedy’s distinction, the nation for Fidesz was considered ‘the ultimate source of legitimacy’,
and reinterpreted something ‘pre-political’ or cultural, and claimed as its ‘own exclusive terrain’
(Egedy 2013, 71). Populist rhetoric with dichotomy building and constitutive common points of
reference were present well before the 2002 elections after which Egedy argues ‘plebeian con-
servatism’ was full blown. Fidesz refused ‘to concede the electoral defeat of 2002 declaring that
“The Mother Country (Haza) cannot be in opposition!”’ (Péteri 2014). Orbán’s claim revealed the
idea of exclusive ownership of the nation and the constitutive rhetoric. The universalising logic of
the populist articulation prevails in constitution of the historical subject through ‘haza’.
Fidesz cast populist articulation in stone for a universalising historical subjectivity to emerge
through identification, through street names and memorials, architecture and urban renewal
(Palonen 2013). The capital city, Budapest, was in the hands of socialists and liberals, but the
Fidesz government offered funds for the renovation of regional cities with loyal leadership.
Populism became entangled with nationalism. The Fidesz-MDF government pushed through a
Status Law of 2001 that offered ethnic Hungarians outside the national borders the right to vote in
Hungary (Bátory 2009).
Political polarisation from the millennium
By 2000, almost all parties were trying to generate a collective as a historical subject (on liberal Free
Democrats see Palonen 2005). Each of these had some notion of the people, a range of demands
and a clear political frontier. It became a battle over who represented the political ‘us’ in 2002.
Electoral laws also contributed to the two-party competition.
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Confrontational rhetoric is Orbán’s trademark. It contributed to the polarisation of the
political spectrum into the ‘anti-communist-anti-liberal’ and the ‘anti-nationalist’ camps from
the transitions tripartite party spectrum. In 1998–2002, Orbán’s government articulated a new
era and nationhood through films, architecture and exhibitions, and political concepts such as
‘polgári’, civic and bourgeois, as a symbol of unity (Fowler 2004). Moving towards an orange
‘polgári’ platform disassociated them, at least briefly, from the simple nationalist–non-nationalist
dichotomy.
Universalising symbols were competed over as tools for articulating this historical subject: the
Socialist party under Péter Medgyessy sought to represent the ‘country’ and occupy a civic concept
of nationalism; they succeeded in the election campaigning in 2002. An ethnic nation of 15 million
Hungarians (beyond the borders) for Fidesz and the 10 million Hungarian citizens of the Socialists,
and the wearing of the Hungarian national badge, kokárda, became divisive symbols. In general,
the polarisation was performed through co-constituting rejection: Fidesz was accused of national-
ism and the Socialists of communism. Fidesz was viewed as a bunch of neo-feudalist elites and the
Socialists as a bunch of neoliberal elites.
The Socialists took a second consecutive victory at the elections in 2006: the system was
considered mature by political science standards. Belief in democracy and the legitimacy of the
leftist parties were, however, questioned as PM Ferenc Gyurcśanyi in 2006 admitted to having been
lying day and night, causing the collapse of the belief in democracy. Left-wing voters joined the
protest. The emperor was revealed as being naked. It became apparent that as people commonly
knew – politicians lie (Palonen 2012). Rubber bullets had been fired into the rioting crowds, but this
was denied by the government. The left started to fragment and many former voters fled to the
other side.
As the opinion polls predicted victory for Fidesz prior to the elections, Orbán declared a
revolution at the polls. Revolution may appear in other contexts as illegitimate, revolution against
the oppressors has often a positive tone in Hungary. To mark the change of power, with a two-
thirds parliamentary majority, Fidesz engaged in activities familiar from previous revolutionary
transformations: the power-holders started rewriting the Constitution, changing memorials and
renaming streets. After 2010 the weakened opposition provided little to challenge to Orbán. The
left and liberal parties multiplied, even the new Green party split into two. The left-leaning
philosophers, the judiciary, the art elites, among many, became the targets of the Fidesz
‘revolution’.
Symbolising us and the other: transforming Orbán
Populist political articulation requires a careful balance between the ‘us’ and the ‘other’. In Laclau’s
theory, the leader often becomes the symbol of unity. In opposition after 2002, Orbán dismissed
parliamentarism emphasising the ‘pre-political’ character of his notion of nationhood, democracy
and the people. He left behind the exclusive and future-oriented polgári conceptualisation, and
went back to articulating plebs to represent the populus in the classical understanding of populism
(Panizza 2005; c.f. Laclau 2005). He transformed his rhetoric: not turning up at the Hungarian
Parliament for years but swapping his suit for a checked shirt argued for village parliaments and
mobilised support on referenda. The people was articulated through anti-elitism.
Political ideology never seemed vital for Orbán. He appears as a power-seeking ‘post-ideologi-
cal’ politician fit for an era where meanings are fast reworked and lines of differentiation shifted. As
a youth leader, he had potential for the liberal camp, but he chose the right. Orbán rearticulated
the political other by always inventing new dichotomies for political identifications, generating
common points through empty signifiers, symbolising particularly the (potentially) oppressive
other and thereby ‘us’.
Transforming lines of antagonism and adding rhetorical dimensions both to the past and the
future in the enemy image offered durability to Orbán’s populist rhetoric. The dichotomous
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populist logic generated constitutive antagonism: the major claim to power was justified on the
illegitimacy of the other (Palonen 2009), particularly referring to the nation in the early 2002, but by
2010 to the failure of the other to govern. After two decades in the limelight as one of the key
politicians in the country, in 2010, Orbán became PM again after a historic landslide victory. Next
sections introduce three symbols of othering, particularly present in post-2010 Hungary. Through
these he managed to avoid bursting the bubble of populist life-cycle (Herkman 2017): rhetoric on
revolution and illiberalism that maintained the frontier of polarisation and the move to claim other
parties’ dichotomous language and attitudes.
Symbols of othering I: revolution
Reading from the post-foundational perspective, the term ‘revolution’ in Hungary has always had
an important role as a key signifier in the discursive constitution of the people. Revolutions
themselves carry symbolic value (e.g. Nyyssönen 1999; Palonen 2011), and following Laclau and
Mouffe (1985) rather than constituting a total break they often carry elements of the previous eras.
Hence, rhetoric on revolution in Hungary expresses continuity as much as change (Palonen 2011). It
constitutes the people, generates populist moments and challenges the life-cycle or usual wearing
out of populism. Once in power, the break from the past regime of governance was enacted and
symbolised in many ways. The landslide victory provided Fidesz with a two-third majority in the
parliament that enabled constitutional changes. The spirit of the revolution kept an ‘enemy’ or
political other present: this other could be simply ‘the past’ and former powerholders. To mark the
revolution as a sweeping change, symbols were changed: investing in football stadiums and
renovating public spaces, launching a new commemorative turn was to finish ‘decommunisation’
(e.g. Ukraine in Shevel 2016). The new order was symbolised particularly through interwar memory:
the parliament legislated upon the commemoration of the traumatic Trianon peace treaty that
ended WWI for Hungary (Feischmidt et al. 2014). In 2010, the law on Trianon commemoration day
was passed and sparked debate in the community of historians (Kovács 2016). Interwar memorials
were restored around the parliament and a memorial to the WWII ‘German Occupation’ of Hungary
was erected in 2014, provoking debate and a counter-memorial. Symbolic acts articulated a
dichotomy between ‘us’ and them could be articulated by the powerholders. They sought to
maintain a crisis to defend and constitute the people by rewriting the national past.
Fidesz performatively carried out the devaluation of 1989 as a revolution. Indeed, the term
‘negotiated revolution’ is paradoxical in many ways. Yet, in Hungary, where the tradition of
revolutions was celebrated and their fates mourned, a failed or partial revolution lacked the
symbolic value or even legitimacy for bringing a sense of fullness and achievement. Orbán had
only a marginal role regarding the negotiation of the new system, and could be regarded as
leading ‘an outlawed protest movement in the Kádár era’ (Szabó 2011). In line with his anti-
communist stance, Orbán argued that the powerholders and the system itself are compromised (in
a negative understanding) through communism. Fidesz gained a landslide victory in the 2010
elections with a mandate from the people and the necessary two-third majority to implement
constitutional changes. The revolution as legislative activity was pursued.
A key area where international and national attention was targeted was freedom of the media
and restriction of possibilities of the opposition to mobilise prior to the election period. When
internet access was threatened, large demonstrations emerged. Electoral laws were changed to
benefit the largest party. In a country marked by extreme politicisation and polarisation, depoliti-
cisation may have appeared to many locals as a citizen-friendly measure – many Hungarians
disillusioned with politics and politicians were tired of the constant confrontation that had
penetrated social relations and everyday life. Yet, despite the ‘revolution at the polls’, the connec-
tion between parliament and politicians and the citizens did not increase, at least from the citizens’
perspective (Ilonszki and Papp 2012).
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Symbols of othering II: illiberalism
In summer 2014, months after his second consecutive election victory, Orbán denounced liberal
democracy. Illiberal democracy emerged as the name for the new era, it also marked the enemy:
liberals. This made clear a confrontation with liberals and the system implemented for the 1990s:
liberal democracy. Though weak in content, it had power to generate affective ties and disgust.
Even weak enemies can be made discursively present. Fidesz also knew that dichotomous articula-
tion maintains the opposition, and too strong an opposition could challenge their power (Palonen
2009).
Orbán in July 2014 in Băile Tuşnad, Tusznádfürdö, Romania, brought in the concept of ‘illiberal
democracy’ to mark the dichotomy between the liberal and populist-national Hungary. It rejected
the previous system of 1989–2010 as something rotten. In this view, liberals never had the
legitimacy to represent the nation as the people and Western political scientists had imported
into the negotiated revolution was a reformist system, not a real break and new truly Hungarian
era. Many of the reforms were decidedly ‘illiberal’. The reform of media law and the constitutional
reforms strengthened dominance of the strongest political party. The reforms constituted the
people through its other.
The political scientist Takis Pappas (2018) argues that populism is democratic but illiberal,
whereas authoritarianism is anti-democratic. Yet here anti-liberalism is a performative notion that
generates a political polarisation and is operationalised for political gain (Palonen 2009): it is a
symbolic-constitutive rejection of the liberal left as illegitimate to rule or participate in (defining
‘real’) democracy.
Illiberalism can be seen in the Hungarian context as a marker for a new era, drawing a
distinction between the past and present liberal democracy established at the end of the round-
table talks and the Orbán era’s own approach negatively termed. Orbán managed to define the
Hungarian and European liberals as the enemy and rearticulate the nation as the basis of
legitimacy. For the rule of law, this exclusion that can be revisited in the attitudes to NGOs is
revealing: people becomes an exclusive rather than inclusive category.
Symbolic othering III: nationalism and ‘migrants’
During the postcommunist period, competing interpretations of the Hungarian ‘nation’ divided
historians into two camps (Egry 2018). Practiced nationalisms multiplied: social anthropologists
found fragmented communities with their own national expressions, myths and beliefs (Feischmidt
et al. 2014). Official discourse is, however, more solid: a pan-European secularist Christian civilisa-
tionalist nationalism has been detected also in Hungary (Brubaker 2017; The Fundamental Law of
Hungary 2016). Orbán identified it as the government’s ideology for the third term, sedimented in
the ‘Future of Europe’ conference in Budapest 24–25 May 2018, where a keynote speaker was the
US president Donald Trumps’s former ideologue Steve Bannon.
In the anti-liberal, essentialist, and völkisch narrative, Hungarians arrived unchanged in the
territory, extending the current borders, and had a role in defending Christian Europe from the
Muslim invaders (e.g. Egry 2018; Trenchényi 2011). This narrative and the interwar Christian
democratic Europeanist ideals and praxis (Egry 2015: 124, 174, 179) are visible both in the
restoration of interwar memorials and discussions on immigration. Alongside illiberalism and
migration it offers ideological substance to the strategic exclusion (othering) through which
Fidesz generates its position in Hungarian politics.
The wall on the southern border of Hungary blocked the flow of refugees into Hungary and
the Schengen area. In 2015, the ‘refugee crisis’ hit Hungary, and Orbán declared early on that
Hungary would build a wall against them. Even more significant was the branding of the
refugees as an enemy that the government was protecting the people against, hence, consti-
tuting the people. Similarly, the opposition to the European Union was set in terms of Orbán as
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a European leader defending the interests of the country: any sanctions by the European Union
could only be reduced to the line of polarisation between Hungary where the Orbán govern-
ment protects the Hungarian nation against its enemies. The asylum seekers were predomi-
nantly Muslim, which contrasted with the Christian narrative of Hungary but fitted with the idea
of Hungary as Europe’s fortress. This also left aside the narratives and voice of the Hungarian
Jews.
Adopting nationalist ethnicist articulation alongside populism, Fidesz moved to the territory of
the anti-elitist nationalist Jobbik, long considered a marginal challenger, and presented in relation
to their later-banned paramilitary wing the Hungarian Guard. Jobbik emerged through a populist
frame, where nationalism becomes entangled with economics, exploiting rural grievances and anti-
Roma discourse. ‘In the face of economic decline and unresponsive authorities’, transition losers
formulate grievances ethnically and activate ‘popular anti-Roma sensibilities and created space for
the politicization of ethnicity’ (Feischmidt and Szombati 2017, 326). When Fidesz occupied the
xenophobic nationalist right position, Jobbik presented an increasingly centrist vision (Hyttinen
and Näre 2017). Jobbik turned away from racist discourse in a top-down process as the party leader
Gábor Vona reacted to Orbán’s Fidesz adopting their xenophobic rhetoric.
The Fidesz discourse was visible all around the country during the elections spring in 2018.
Billboards were filled with government-sponsored adverts with a simple message against immigra-
tion: STOP. One of the distrusted personalities was the Jewish-Hungarian millionaire George Soros:
the othering meaning-making constituted the national us as distinct from the Soros army or team.
Because they were combined in the same signifying chain – to borrow Laclau’s term – the
insistence on Christian Europe and illiberalism during the election of spring 2018, these attacks
on the Jewish claims are easy to interpret as implicitly anti-Semitist. This was in line with the
Laclaudian idea of polarisation as bi-polar hegemony (Palonen 2009). Had Fidesz targeted their
resentment on the Jobbik, they would have elevated them to the level of equals. However, by
adopting their demands, they could claim their political space and rigor.
Democracy and Janus-faced populism
Existing research asks whether populism is a threat or corrective to democracy (e.g. Mudde and
Kaltwasser 2013). In these questions, democracy often is reduced to a regime. Yet, democracy is
processual: the generation of political community at large for the population to participate in
elections, and communities to channel votes to different parties has required banal nationalism
(Billig 1995), which also sustains a political community. It usually defines populism in substantive
terms and not as an empty shell (Freeden 2017). In the negative ontology of populism (Stavrakakis
2014; Laclau 2005), there is the double-bind with democracy (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005): populism
is necessary for democracy but pure populism can also be a challenge to it (Gürhanli 2018).
Democratically conceived, nationalism and populism resist essentialisation and sedimentation:
the communities and boundaries are both left negotiable (Mouffe 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).
While nationalism is always exclusive to those not included in the nation, some exclusion is
necessary for ‘the people’ as a political community to emerge (Butler 2015, 5). From the post-
foundational perspective, populism has the potential to include previously excluded groups or
identities, address accessibly of complex political phenomena and expose ‘dysfunctions of the
contemporary democratic systems’, even offering alternative influencing tools other than mere
voting (Moffitt 2016: 144, 142–149). The articulation of an ‘us’ with limits resembles any political
logic (Arditi 2010), but it crucially brings politics and contingency of us and political demands back
to politics. Here, us is not socio-economic or interest-based.
Post-foundational theory insists that a political ‘us’ does not exist in socio-economic terms
before articulation. Traditional liberal democratic analysis sees population separated into demo-
graphic groups with pre-existing interest or issues that parties simply pick and represent. Cleavages
appear structured through (relatively fixed) socio-economic features. This understanding of politics
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should be called ‘demographic’. Yet in (radical) ‘democracy’, political frontiers are articulated as
part of political struggle, the making of demands and meanings in politics. In these processes
affective ties, identification and articulation of political demands are central (Mouffe 2000, 2005).
This enables the emergence of populist movements that generate new meaning and invent new
cleavages that are not sedimented. Populism is Janus-faced in the same manner as nationalism:
necessary and evil. Rather, for democracy and the rule of law, it is important to see what gets
entangled with populism and how these political differences sediment and become decontested
through democratic means.
Conclusions
This article has argued that every transformation of power contains populism: constituting political
us in an affective process through generation of one or more historical subject with an ambiguous
‘us’ and political frontiers. Generating political togetherness and even democratic participation,
populism is a necessary part of the political process and democracy. In (radical) democracy, political
frontiers are not simply demographically formed or sedimented. Related to the above, in a post-
foundational, Laclaudian vain, this article sees democracy not as a system but as a process: one
where political alliances and frontiers are formed, irrespective of sedimented differences and socio-
economic characteristics. Populist articulations have a key role in this.
Going over some of the key populist moments in Hungarian history, this article has noted the
way in which frontier-building dichotomies and part-represents-the-whole articulations have been
central to Fidesz meaning-making. Orbán initially operationalised ‘the youth’ as those excluded
from the round-table talks that negotiated the new system with rule of law and returned to the
same dichotomy in the 2010s, yielding to illiberalism. He maintained the populist hype by rallying
against immigrants and the American-Hungarian millionaire Georges Soros. He rearticulated the
frontier of polarisation in the early 2000s, when two political communities had co-constituted each
other by mutually demonising the other side.
Democracy is challenged when populism institutionalises into a polarised frontier that directs all
debate into a simple distinction, or sediments beyond leaders and frontier-building (Palonen 2009).
Another study could account for the distinction between populism and clientelistic relations,
offering economic advantages to the state and European Union-funded building programmes
and sediment the originally rhetorical polarisation in a different manner.
As populism is an empty form, it is central to see what it entangles. The examples of populist
rhetoric here were revolution, illiberalism and migration crisis that generate affects, frontier and the
abstract political us. Despite problematic contents and relation to the rule of law, they played an
important role in the populist logic of political meaning-making for Orbán to draw his support
base. In 2018, he seeks to sediment it ideologically more coherently to Interwar-inspired Christian
Democracy. Building of political communities is a democratic activity, but sedimenting an exclusive
community with moral rights highlights the negative face of populism.
Note
1. Poststructuralist understanding meanings are explored, emerging through relations or (dis)connections in a
non-predetermined way, while post-foundational perspective pays attention to the foundations on which
meanings are established, narrated or articulated (Bevir 2010; Marchart 2007).
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